Benchmark Index of Risk Appetite

Changes in investors' risk appetite have been used to explain a variety of phenomena in asset markets. And yet, popular indicators of changes in risk appetite typically have scant foundation in theory, and give contradictory signals in practice. The question is which popular indicator, if any, captures these changes. Kumar and Persaud (2002) offer an intuitively appealing argument regarding the effects of changes in risk appetite on asset prices in a portfolio, and Misina (2003) establishes the conditions under which these effects will be present. The author proposes a method that empirically implements these conditions and thus ensures that the resulting index can identify changes in risk appetite in the data. This index is then used to assess other risk appetite indexes used in practice. An example illustrates how the index can be used to help interpret price movements in foreign exchange markets.Economic models; Financial markets

What Does the Risk-Appetite Index Measure?

Explanations of changes in asset prices as being due to exogenous changes in risk appetite, although arguably controversial, have been popular in the financial community and have also received some attention in attempts to account for recent financial crises. Operational versions of these explanations are based on the assumption that changes in asset prices can be decomposed into a part that can be attributed to changes in riskiness and a part attributable to changes in risk aversion, and that some quantitative measure can capture these effects in isolation. One such measure, the risk-appetite index (RAI)-- used in the financial community as well as in assessments of financial stability in emerging markets -- is based on the rank correlation between assets' riskiness and excess returns. The author seeks to provide a theoretical foundation for this measure. He summarizes the arguments behind the index in two propositions and attempts to derive these propositions within a class of well-specified asset-pricing models. His results indicate that, whereas the exclusive attribution of the rank effect to changes in risk aversion is problematic in general, a specific set of circumstances can be identified in which this attribution is permissible. The key assumption is identified, and its empirical implications are examined. In cases where this assumption is shown to be empirically valid, the model provides a theoretical foundation for the RAI.Economic models; Financial markets

Are Distorted Beliefs Too Good to be True?

In a recent attempt to account for the equity-premium puzzle within a representative-agent model, Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) relax the assumption of rational expectations and in its place use the assumption of distorted beliefs. The author shows that the explanatory power of the distorted beliefs model is due to an inconsistency in the model and that an attempt to remove this inconsistency removes the model’s explanatory power. Using the theory of rational beliefs, the author constructs a model in which the inconsistency is not present, compares its performance with that of the distorted beliefs model, and gives a simple interpretation of the results obtained.Economic models; Financial markets

What does the risk-appetite index measure?

Explanations of changes in asset prices as being due to exogenous changes in risk appetite assume that changes in asset prices due to changes in risk aversion can be uniquely identified, and that some quantitative measure can capture these in isolation. One such measure, the risk-appetite index, is based on the rank correlation between assets' riskiness and excess returns. The author seeks to provide a theoretical foundation for this measure. The arguments behind the index are given in two propositions and these are derived within a class of well-specified asset-pricing models. His results indicate that, whereas the exclusive attribution of the rank effect to changes in risk aversion is problematic in general, a specific set of circumstances can be identified in which this attribution is permissible. The key assumption is identified, and its empirical implications are examined.

Risk Perceptions and Attitudes

Changes in risk perception have been used in various contexts to explain shorter-term developments in financial markets, as part of a mechanism that amplifies fluctuations in financial markets, as well as in accounts of "irrational exuberance." This approach holds that changes in risk perception affect actions undertaken in risky situations, and create a discrepancy between the risk attitude implied by those actions and the a priori description of risk attitude as summarized by the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion. The author characterizes this discrepancy by introducing the notion of risk perception within the expected utility theory, and proposes the concept of implied risk aversion as a summary measure of risk attitudes implied by agents' actions. Properties of implied risk aversion are related to an individual's future outlook. Key ideas are illustrated using an asset-pricing model.Economic models; Financial markets

Credit, Asset Prices, and Financial Stress in Canada

Historical narratives typically associate financial crises with credit expansions and asset price misalignments. The question is whether some combination of measures of credit and asset prices can be used to predict these events. Borio and Lowe (2002) answer this question in the affirmative for a sample of 34 countries, but the question is surprisingly difficult to answer for individual developed countries that have faced very few, if any, financial crises in the past. To circumvent this problem, we focus on financial stress and ask whether credit and asset price movements can help predict it. To measure financial stress, we use the Financial Stress Index (FSI) developed by Illing and Liu (2006). Other innovations include the estimation and forecasting using both linear and endogenous threshold models, and a wide range of asset prices (stock and housing prices, for example). The exercise is performed for Canada, but the methodology is suitable for any country that fits the above description.Credit and credit aggregates; Financial stability

Non-Linearities, Model Uncertainty, and Macro Stress Testing

A distinguishing feature of macro stress testing exercises is the use of macroeconomic models in scenario design and implementation. It is widely agreed that scenarios should be based on "rare but plausible" events that have either resulted in vulnerabilities in the past or could do so in the future. This requirement, however, raises a number of difficult statistical and methodological problems. Economic models, as well as the statistical models of the relationships among economic variables, generally focus on capturing the average rather than the extreme behaviour, and frequently rely on the assumption of linearity. In this paper we show that these models are particularly ill-suited for stress-testing as they do not adequately capture past behaviour in extreme events, nor do they generate plausible responses to shocks under stress. Whereas one might argue that the use of these models is still preferable to no having no models, since they at least impose the consistency restrictions on the paths generated under the scenario, failing to deal with a large extent of uncertainty of these paths may lead to results that are non-informative, and potentially misleading. The paper illustrates both of these problems by a series of examples, but our conclusions have broader implications for the types of models that would be useful in these exercises.Financial stability

Stress Testing the Corporate Loans Portfolio of the Canadian Banking Sector

Stress testing, at its most general level, is an investigation of the performance of an entity under abnormal operating conditions. The authors focus on one set of entities--the Canadian banking sector--and investigate losses in the loans portfolio of this sector as a function of changing circumstances in the different industries in which these loans reside. These circumstances are characterized by means of one summary measure--sectoral probabilities of default--and this measure is modelled as a function of macroeconomic variables. Using this model, the authors assess the interrelationship between the macroeconomic environment and sectoral defaults, and perform a series of stress tests under different scenarios that are thought to be most pertinent to Canada. The tools underlying the authors' analysis are general and can be applied to other countries, as well as to other macroeconomic scenarios.Financial stability, Financial institutions